

File

IC STAFF
Routing Slip

TO:	ACTION	COORD	INFO
EO/ICS			X
D/ICS			X
DD/ICS			X
EA-D/ICS			X
SA-D/ICS-EP			
OIC&E			X
OHC			X
OSC			X
OPBC			X
OA&E			X
OP			X
OCC			X
NFIB			
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SECOM			
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Registry			
A/S			
<p style="text-align: right;">SUSPENSE: _____ Date</p>			
REMARKS:			

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDSET		X		
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/ACIS	X			
21					
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
SUSPENSE 9 Dec
Date

Remarks:

Please prepare response for DCI's signature.

[Signature]
Executive Secretary
30 November 1982
Date

9627 (10-81)



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

1 DEC 1982
LOGGED

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

November 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Energy
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Personnel Assigned to Arms Control Verification

Chairman Percy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has written to me pursuant to Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (as Amended) to request information concerning personnel engaged in arms control verification. In order to comply with this request and the statutory provision, we need to know the number of professional personnel assigned to arms control verification on a full-time basis in your respective departments and agencies.


The meaning of the phrase "professional personnel assigned to arms control verification on a full-time basis" is not defined in the statute. However, the statute and its legislative history indicate that ACDA has the responsibility to prepare a report that delineates the full scope of the verification process including the persons engaged therein. For purposes of this report, we consider the statutory language to refer to those officials whose professional functions or responsibilities in substantial part (approximately 75 percent or more) are involved in the process of determining whether parties to existing arms control agreements with the United States are complying with the terms of their obligations or whether such compliance could be determined under proposed arms control agreements.

In order to respond as fully as possible to this request, I ask that you provide a report of the professional personnel assigned to arms control verification on a full-time basis. This should include an explanation of the type of verification



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activity in which the reported personnel are engaged and the percentage of their total time spent on verification activities. I have attached a statement of the various activities and functions that are considered to be part of the process of verification.


Eugene V. Rostow

Attachment:

Statement of Activities and Functions

STATEMENT OF ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS
THAT ARE PART OF THE VERIFICATION PROCESS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT (AS AMENDED)

For the purpose of estimating the number of personnel assigned to arms control verification on a full-time basis, the following activities shall be considered:

1. Personnel to be counted are those who are specifically assigned to arms control verification-related tasks, as defined below, for approximately 75 percent or more of their time.

2. "Arms control verification" includes the following:

(a) for existing agreements:

- (i) the collation of U.S. intelligence data germane to verification (verification intelligence);
- (ii) the preliminary analysis, and the formatting for use by U.S. policy components, of verification intelligence;
- (iii) the preparation of analyses of evidence of possible non-compliance for use by policymakers.
- (iv) the preparation for and the implementation of "cooperative measures" intended to enhance U.S. verification capabilities.

(b) for agreements under active consideration:

- (i) the development of options for possible provisions of arms control agreements, including cooperative measures, that could assure that verification needs can be given proper weight;
- (ii) as specifically requested by the policy community, the preparation of descriptions of verifiability of all provisions under consideration;

(c) for all agreements existing and under consideration

- (i) the analyses of options for tasking of existing U.S. resources for the purpose of obtaining verification intelligence

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and the preparation of tasking instructions;

- (ii) the preparation of analyses of the value and cost of possible new U.S. intelligence resources for improving U.S. capability to obtain verification intelligence.